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INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes whether international tribunals can find
Multilateral Development Banks (“MDBs”) liable for human rights
violations that occur in developing countries as a result of projects
financed by these MDBs. It seeks to address the gap under
international law concerning direct responsibility of MDBs, as well
as to provide legal approaches for the progressive development of an
applicable international legal framework. It is not within the scope of
this article to analyze legal approaches towards: state responsibility
for MDBs’ wrongful acts before international tribunals;1 human
rights responsibility before political bodies;2 or direct responsibility
of MDBs before domestic courts.3
Part I briefly addresses the meaning of the term “Multilateral
Development Banks” since international law does not define it. Part
II identifies the general rules concerning legal personality under
international law. In particular, it develops legal approaches
pertaining to the personality of MDBs. Part III discusses the existing

1. See generally August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal
Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors, in NON-STATES ACTORS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 78-82 (Philip Alston ed. 2005) (analyzing the issue of state
responsibility for non-state activities as a means to protect human rights violated
by those activities).
2. See, e.g., U.N. H.R. Comm. as established by Article 28 of the Int’l
Covenant on Civil and Pol. Rts.; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts. as
determined by the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Res. 1985/17 (28 May
1985).
3. See generally Reinisch, supra note 1, at 87-89 (discussing the part that
domestic courts play in enforcing human rights as against non-state actors).
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rules of international law concerning responsibility, as well as legal
approaches regarding ways to attribute responsibility to MDBs when
they cause wrongful acts.
Part IV focuses on the approaches developed by MDBs regarding
human rights protection. MDBs have established operational policies
regarding particular themes in order to underline safeguard measures.
They have also created internal inspection mechanisms as a means to
assure their compliance with those operational policies because of
human rights concerns. In this regard, the notion of an effective
remedy under international human rights law will play a critical role
in determining the ineffectiveness of MDBs’ approaches from a
human rights viewpoint. Part V concludes that a gap exists in
international law because there is no mechanism for holding MDBs
responsible for human rights violations that have occurred as a result
of projects that they financed.

I. DEFINING MDBS
MDBs are international organizations created by states or regions,
and charged with fostering economic and social development, either
in the public or private sector.4 In this regard, they constitute a
particular category of International Financial Institutions (“IFIs”).
The most influential MDBs operating in developing countries
throughout the Americas are the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”) (which is part of the
World Bank),5 the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”),6 and
the Inter-American Development Bank (“IADB”).7
MDBs arise out of state-created constituent instruments often
referred to as Articles of Agreement.8 MDBs’ Articles of
4. See,
e.g.,
World
Bank,
Multilateral
Development
Banks,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040614~menuPK:41699~pageP
K:43912~piPK:44037~theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010)
(listing four regional development banks and explaining that both developed and
developing countries may be members of the development banks).
5. World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
6. International Financial Corporation [IFC], http://www.ifc.org (last visited
Mar. 30, 2010).
7. Inter-American Development Bank [IADB], http://www.iadb.org (last
visited Mar. 30, 2010).
8. See,
e.g.,
World
Bank,
Articles
of
Agreement,
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Agreements are ‘treaties’ per the legal meaning given to that term as
reflected in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) of 1969.9 The majority of the
provisions of the Vienna Convention represent the codification of
pre-existing rules of customary international law, but some
provisions also reflect a progressive development of the law.10
According to Article 5, the Vienna Convention applies to MDBs’
Articles of Agreements because they are treaties constituting
international organizations.11
States act collectively through the MDB structure. As multilateral
institutions, MDBs are exclusively comprised of and governed by
states.12 Their membership is open only to states, although
membership is not restricted to those states that create a specific
MDB. For instance, according to the IADB’s Articles of Agreement,
the original members are members of the Organization of American
States (“OAS”), but the membership is also open to non-regional
countries that are members of the International Monetary Fund if
admitted by the Bank and under the rules of the Bank’s board of
directors.13
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/
ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:50004943~menuPK:64020045~pag
ePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2010) (providing the organizational framework for each group).
9. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“For the
purposes of the present Convention: (a) ‘treaty’ means an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation.”).
10. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 580 (6th ed.
2003).
11. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 5 (“The present Convention
applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international
organization and to any treaty adopted within an international organization without
prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization.”).
12. See Robert T. Coulter, Leonardo A. Crippa & Emily Wann, Principles of
International Law for Multilateral Development Banks: The Obligation to Respect
Human Rights 8 & n. 22 (Indian Law Resource Ctr., Washington, D.C., 2009),
available
at
http://www.dar.org.pe/documentos/cartas/200901%20Principles%20Memo%20FINAL%20ENG.pdf.
13. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank (IADB), Agreement Establishing the Inter-American
Development Bank art. II, § 1, Apr. 8, 1959, 10 U.S.T. 3029, 389 U.N.T.S. 69
[hereinafter IADB Establishing Agreement].
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MDBs decision-making organs are comprised of representatives
from each MDB member state. For instance, according to the
IADB’s Articles of Agreement, all the power of the Bank is vested in
the Board of Governors, which can delegate functions to the Board
of Executive Directors.14 Each of these organs is exclusively made up
of representatives of member states.15 A member state’s voting rights
in the decision-making organs depend on how much the country is
contributing to the Bank’s capital stock.16
MDBs work toward the economic and social development of
developing member countries, and universal MDBs, like those within
the World Bank, operate in developing member countries around the
world.17 Regional MDBs operate in specific regions of the world,18
such as the IADB in Latin-American developing countries.
According to the IADB’s Articles of Agreement, the Bank’s purpose
is to contribute to the development of the regional developing
member countries, individually and collectively.19
Finally, MDBs execute their mandates by focusing on the public
and/or private sector. On one hand, the IADB and the World Bank

14. See id. art. VIII, § 2 (prohibiting the Board of Governors from delegating
certain tasks to the Board of Executive Directors, including the powers “to admit
new members” and “authorize the conclusion of general agreements for
cooperation with other international organizations”).
15. See id. art. VIII, § 3 (requiring that the executive directors “be persons of
recognized competence and wide experience in economic and financial matters but
. . . not be governors”).
16. JOHN RUTHRAUFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD BANK, INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 6
(Elizabeth Zechmeister ed., 1997).
17. See, e.g., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles
of
Agreement
art.
1,
Feb.
16,
1989,
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrdarticlesofagreement.pdf [hereinafter IBRD Articles of Agreement] (“The purposes
of the Bank are: (i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of
members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes,
including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the
reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of
the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed
countries.”)
18. Regional MDBs include the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and
the African Development Bank.
19. IADB Establishing Agreement, supra note 13, art. I, § 1.
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mainly carry out their operations and projects in the public sector,20
provided that their purposes are to accelerate the development of
developing member countries. On the other hand, the IFC focuses
exclusively on private enterprises located in member countries.21

II. INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY
Whether MDBs can be held liable for the international human
rights violations of their financed projects depends on whether they
fit into the existing liability rules under international law. These rules
apply to legal personalities. This Part considers whether MDBs
possess legal personality under international law.

A. SUBJECTS OF LAW
An entity has a legal international personality, in an original or
derivative fashion, when legal rights and obligations under
international law apply to that entity. Without question, states are the
original subjects of international law, as they are the foundation of
the international legal framework. A state’s international personality
is not only original but also necessary for the international legal
system because the creation of other subjects of international law
depends on states’ consent,22 among other factors. For that reason,
other subjects of law—that is, other entities to which international
law applies—possess a derivative legal international personality.23
20. See generally id. art. I, § 1; IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17,
art. I.
21. See Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation art. 1,
May 25, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter IFC Articles of
Agreement] (“The purpose of the Corporation is to further economic development
by encouraging the growth of productive private enterprises in member countries,
particularly in the less developed areas, thus supplementing the activities of the
[IBRD] . . . .”).
22. MONCAYO VINUESA GUTIÉRREZ POSSE, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
PÚBLICO (PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW) 15-16 (Zavalía ed. 1999).
23. See id. (explaining that states have original personality and that the legal
personality of international organizations is derived from the purpose for which
states created them); see also Sascha Rolf Lüder, The Legal Nature of the
International Criminal Court and the Emergence of Supranational Elements in
International Criminal Justice, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 79, 80 (2002), available
at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/59KDCL/$File/079092_Luder.pdf (asserting that states have international organizations derive their
personality from the states that created them).
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Scholars have identified several elements as crucial to determining
legal personality under international law. These elements are: (1) the
“capacity to make claims in respect to breaches of international law”;
(2) the “capacity to make treaties and agreements valid on the
international plane”; and (3) the “enjoyment of privileges and
immunities from national jurisdictions.”24
1. Public International Law
In public international law there is an on-going debate about who
are the proper subjects of international law. On the one hand, there is
an outlook that suggests that only states have an international
personality. On the other hand, there is a broader viewpoint that
advocates for a more comprehensive approach and supports the idea
that, apart from states, there are other entities with international legal
personalities. Under the latter view, there are certain entities that
might be considered subjects of international law, such as
individuals, non-self-governing peoples, and belligerent and
insurgent communities.25 A growing consensus—evidenced by the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), various
Vienna Conventions, and a developing public international law
treaty—asserts that international organizations are subjects of
international law.
First, the ICJ has treated the United Nations as a subject of
international law. In the Reparations advisory opinion of 1949, the
Court stated that the United Nations “was intended to exercise and
enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights
which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large
measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon
an international plane.”26 Since that opinion, the debate about the
24. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 57; see also Menno T. Kamminga, The
Evolving Status of NGOs Under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State
System?, in NON-STATES ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 93, 94-95
(Philip Alston ed. 2005) (applying a slight modification of Brownlie’s approach in
order to analyze to the status of NGOs under international law).
25. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 483 (June 27) (stating
that states parties to treaties can commence international proceedings on behalf of
their nationals); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 57-67 (suggesting different
entities that have international legal personalities).
26. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter U.N. Service
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legal personality of international organizations has evolved
considerably. Indeed, thirty years later, in the 1980 WHO opinion,
the Court established that “[i]nternational organizations are subjects
of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under
their constitutions or under international agreements to which they
are parties.”27
Second, the Vienna Convention refers to international
organizations. Article 5 states that the “Convention applies to any
treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international
organization and to any treaty adopted within an international
organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the
organization.”28 Article 2(1)(i) provides that “[f]or the purposes of
the present Convention: . . . ‘international organization’ means an
intergovernmental organization.”29 Three other Vienna conventions
use the same legal definition and take the same approach: the Vienna
Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with
International Organizations of a Universal Character,30 the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,31 and the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International
Organizations
or
Between
International
32
Organizations.
Finally, a developing treaty is also adopting the same position with
regard to the legal personality of international organizations. The
International Law Commission (“ILC”), responsible for elaborating
the Draft Convention on Responsibility of International

Reparations].
27. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and
Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-90 (Dec. 20).
28. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 5.
29. Id. art. 2(1)(i).
30. Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with
International Organizations of a Universal Character art. 1(1)(1), Mar. 14, 1975, 11
I.L.M. 499 (not yet in force).
31. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art.
2(1)(n), Aug. 23, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488.
32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations art. 2(1)(i),
Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 (“1. For the purposes of the present Convention: . . .
“(i) ‘international organization’ means an intergovernmental organization . . . .”).
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Organizations, has defined international organizations under Article
2 as “an organization established by a treaty or other instrument
governed by international law and possessing its own international
legal personality. International organizations may include as
members, in addition to States, other entities.”33
2. International Human Rights Law
There are two subjects of law clearly identified under the
governing rules of international human rights law:34 the states parties
and individuals. On one hand, states parties of human rights treaties
are subjects of the law. They have been embodied with a passive
personality, provided that they have assumed obligations towards the
protection of the fundamental rights of those individuals who are
subject to their jurisdiction. Regional human rights treaties clearly
determine such personality, including the American Convention on
Human Rights (“American Convention”), the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“European Convention”), and the African Charter of Human and
Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”).35
33. U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations: Titles
and Texts of the Draft Articles 1, 2 and 3 Adopted by the Drafting Committee, art.
2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.632 (June 4, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n,
Draft Articles 1, 2 and 3].
34. See generally Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 45, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter
African Charter]; OAU, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
art.
3,
July
11,
2003,
available
at
http://www.achpr.org/english/women/protocolwomen.pdf [hereinafter Protocol to
African Charter]; Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 32, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221
[hereinafter European Convention]; Organization of American States (OAS),
American Convention on Human Rights arts. 41, 44, 45, 62.3, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
35. See American Convention, supra note 34, art. 1 (assuming an obligation “to
respect the rights and freedoms” under the American Convention, and to refrain
from discrimination); European Convention, supra note 34, art. 1 (“The High
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”); African Charter, supra note
34, art. 1 (“The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the
present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this
Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to
them.”). By assuming obligations to protect such rights, each convention gives its
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On the other hand, individuals and groups have also been granted
international personality. They possess an active personality since
the above-mentioned Conventions entitle them to certain human
rights. But their capacity is limited to the possibility of submitting
claims against states parties, not against other entities.36 They do not
possess the capacity to make claims regarding breaches of rules
concerning anything other than international human rights law, nor
do they possess the capacity to make treaties and agreements valid
on the international plane. Instead, they must submit their claims to
the individual complaint procedure mechanisms before human rights
treaty-bodies, and through which they can make only friendly
settlements with the offending states.37 Finally, neither individuals
nor groups enjoy privileges and immunities from national
jurisdictions.
The foundational rule suggests that only states, as subjects of
international law, have a passive personality. As a result, only states
can be found responsible for human rights violations based on noncompliance with assumed human rights obligations. The main human
rights treaties—the actual legal basis for the regional systems—are
all based on this legal perspective.

respective states parties passive personality.
36. Regional human rights treaties clearly establish such capacity. See, e.g.,
American Convention, supra note 34, art. 44 (“Any person or group of persons, or
any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of
the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party.”);
European Convention, supra note 34, art. 34 (“The Court may receive applications
from any person, non-governmental organisation [sic] or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of
the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of
this right.”); African Charter, supra note 34, art. 55(1) (“Before each Session, the
Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the Communications other than
those of States Parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the members of
the Commission, who shall indicate which Communications should be considered
by the Commission.”).
37. See American Convention, supra note 34, art. 48(1)(f) (“When the
Commission receives a petition or communication alleging violation of any of the
rights protected by this Convention, it shall proceed as follows: . . . The
Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view
to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for the human
rights recognized in this Convention.”).
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B. MDBS AS SUBJECTS OF LAW
On the international plane, there is neither a legal definition for
MDBs nor a legal approach with which to understand their
international personality, or more specifically, their passive
personality under international human rights law. Consequently,
these issues will be analyzed in light of the existing approaches and
definitions concerning international intergovernmental organizations.
This analysis will provide a framework for addressing MDBs as
international organizations.
The following questions, as pointed out earlier, should be
answered in a positive fashion in order to assert MDBs’ legal
personality: (1) whether their constituent instruments are governed
by international law; (2) whether they can make claims regarding
breaches of international law; (3) whether they can celebrate treaties
and agreements valid on the international plane; and (4) whether they
enjoy privileges and immunities from national jurisdictions.
First, MDBs’ constituent instruments are governed by
international law. According to Article 5 of the Vienna Convention,
MDBs’ Articles of Agreements are governed by the Vienna
Convention since they are treaties constituting international
organizations. Moreover, the interpretation of the constituent
instruments as treaties are governed by the rules of interpretation
reflected in the Vienna Convention.38
Second, MDBs do have the capacity to make claims in respect of
breaches of international law. Generally speaking, according to the
Reparations opinion issued by the ICJ, international organizations
such as the United Nations have the capacity to bring an international
claim against a state (whether a member or non-member) for
damages resulting from that state’s breach of its obligations towards
the Organization.39 In accordance with growing opinion, the
“capacity to espouse [international] claims thus depends (1) on the
existence of legal personality and (2) on the interpretation of the
constituent instrument in the light of the purposes and functions of
38. See MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHTS AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK,
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
116-22 (2003) (citing Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention as the
“fundamental rules of interpretation”).
39. U.N. Service Reparations, supra note 26.
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the particular organization.”40 It is clear that MDBs, as international
organizations, do possess an international legal personality.
Therefore, the discussion leans towards the interpretation of MDBs’
constituent instruments in light of their purposes and functions. In
this regard, the governing rules embodied in Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention play a critical role since they were
“developed through centuries of state practice, judicial precedents
and scholarly work.”41 Additionally, it is important to scrutinize the
designs and purposes of the constituent instruments of MDBs.42 It is
natural to conclude that, by virtue of their legal personality and the
purposes and functions of their Articles of Agreement, MDBs are
capable of bringing claims regarding breaches of international law.
Third, MDBs also have the capacity to make treaties and
agreements valid at the international level. The treaty-making power
of an international organization depends on the terms of their
constituent instrument.43 Articles of Agreement do not prevent
MDBs from entering into international treaties and agreements.
Indeed, some MDBs have already entered into agreements with other
international organizations. For instance, the World Bank has a
Relationship Agreement with the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(“ECOSOC”).44
Finally, MDBs enjoy privileges and immunities from national
jurisdictions. Privileges and immunities are recognized in customary
international law; however, according to legal authorities, “there is as
yet no general agreement on the precise content of the customary law
concerning the immunities of international organizations.”45
Apparently, agents of “international organizations are immune from
legal process in respect of all acts performed in their official
capacity.”46 However, with regard to MDBs and according to their
40. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 654.
41. DARROW, supra note 38, at 120 & n.37.
42. Id. at 121.
43. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 651.
44. DARROW, supra note 38, at 124. While the World Bank and ECOSOC
work together, the two organizations carefully delineate the “scope for
cooperation” under the agreement. Id.
45. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 652.
46. Id. (remarking that the degree to which agents enjoy immunity differs, and
that courts address their immunity by referring to principles of diplomatic
immunity, or from principles relating to the functions that the agents carry out for
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corresponding Articles of Agreement, their agents do enjoy
privileges and immunities within the territory of each member state.47
Moreover, the privileges and immunities in question refer to
immunity from legal processes in the context of agents acting in their
official capacity.48
1. MDBs Are International Intergovernmental Organizations
MDBs are international intergovernmental organizations since
they are comprised of and governed by member states. As stated in
Part I, MDBs are created by the consensus of states, and they are
governed by the collective decisions adopted by the decision-making
organs exclusively comprised of member states’ representatives.
Moreover, MDBs themselves expressly regulate their “relations with
other organizations” under their Articles of Agreement.49
States act collectively as international organizations through
MDBs. Indeed, MDBs are acting as “surrogates” for states in some
of their activities because the states are their “lords and masters.”50 In
addition, because MDBs are international organizations that possess
a legal personality independent from their member states, the states
can collectively carry out acts based on MDBs’ constituent
instruments and mandates. Accordingly, while recognizing the
international personality of the United Nations, an international
organization, the ICJ concluded in the Reparations opinion that the

their respective organizations).
47. See, e.g., IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. VII, § 1 (“To
enable the Bank to fulfill the functions with which it is entrusted, the status,
immunities and privileges set forth in this Article shall be accorded to the Bank in
the territories of each member.”).
48. See id. art. VII, § 8(i) (granting immunity to “[a]ll governors, executive
directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank” for official acts, absent
explicit waivers of that immunity).
49. See, e.g., IADB Establishing Agreement, supra note 13, art. XIV, § 2
(allowing the Bank to regulate the flow of information between itself and other
organizations); see also IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. V, § 8
(“Relationship to Other International Organizations”); IFC Articles of Agreement,
supra note 21, art. IV, § 7 (“Relations with other International Organizations”).
50. See Philip Alston, The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International
Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATES ACTORS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 3, 29.
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United Nations has “a large measure of international personality and
the capacity to operate upon an international plane.”51
2. MDBs Are not Non-State Actors
Although there is no legal definition of the term ‘non-state actor’
under international law, MDBs should not be considered as such
since they are international organizations through which states act
collectively. For some scholars, the term ‘non-state actor’ refers to
armed opposition groups in a domestic context that act independent
of states, such as rebel groups, irregular armed groups, insurgents,
dissident armed forces, guerrillas, and liberation movements.52 For
others, ‘non-state actors’ are all the actors—aside from state
agents—”that operate at the international level and are potentially
relevant to international relations.”53 Finally, a third position
considers ‘non-state actors’ as those affected people “who have no
contractual relationship with [MDBs] but whose living conditions are
directly or indirectly affected by the bank-financed operation.”54
Based on these various positions, there is neither a clear definition
nor uniform use of the term non-state actor by legal authorities.
Whatever the prevailing definition that international law may
follow, MDBs should not be considered ‘non-state actors’. As
asserted above, it is clear that MDBs are international
intergovernmental organizations comprised and collectively
governed by states. Furthermore, MDBs do not fit into the category
of ‘non-state actors,’ regardless of the prevailing definition, because
they often comprise groups that do not naturally align their interests
with human rights issues, and that would not claim to be following
relevant rules of international human rights law.55

51. U.N. Service Reparations, supra note 26, at 179.
52. See generally Alston, supra note 50, at 14-19.
53. Id. at 15 (quoting Bas Arts, Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Three
Faces of Power 5 (Max Planck Project Group on Common Goods, Bonn, Working
Paper 2003/4, 2003), available at http://edoc.mpg.de/175439 (follow “2003_4.pdf”
hyperlink at bottom of page).
54. Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complainants and International
Organizations: A Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in
International Financial Institutions, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 403, 411 (2005).
55. Alston, supra note 50, at 29.
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III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The law of responsibility is generally considered in relation to
states because of their original and necessary legal personality at the
international level. However, it encompasses a wide range of
questions that must be considered along with the question of legal
personality.56 Apart from states, other subjects of law, such as
international organizations, can be found responsible according to
international responsibility rules. For this purpose, the human rights
obligations and the responsibility rules are analyzed in detail below,
including their connection with MDBs’ acts.

A. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW OBLIGATIONS
In determining the international responsibility of MDBs, the
human rights obligations need to be identified prior to addressing the
breach of those obligations. Within the Inter-American System on
Human Rights (“Inter-American System”), these obligations are
clearly reflected in the American Convention and have been welldeveloped by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (“InterAmerican Court”). These obligations include: (1) to respect human
rights; (2) to adopt domestic measures; and (3) to redress human
rights violations.57 Although these obligations were established
considering state parties’ compliance, mutatis mutandis they are
suitable for application to international organizations such as MDBs.
1. Obligation to Respect Human Rights
Generally, human rights treaties establish the obligation to respect
all the rights they recognize in favor of all individuals under states’
jurisdiction. This obligation is enshrined in various international
instruments.58 For instance, the American Convention clearly states
that
56. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 419.
57. American Convention, supra note 34, arts. 1(1), 2, 63(1).
58. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 34, art. 1; OAS, Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69; U.N. Charter
art. 55(c); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
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[t]he States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect
the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise
of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for
reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, economic status,
birth, or any other social condition.59
The obligation to respect human rights constitutes the most
important duty undertaken by states under international human rights
law. According to the Inter-American Court in Velasquez Rodriguez,
this obligation refers to two duties: (1) the duty to respect human
rights protected by the human rights treaty; and (2) the duty to ensure
the exercise of those rights to every person subject to state
jurisdiction.60 The Court used the same analysis in later decisions.
For example, in the Awas Tingni case, the Court concluded that the
American Convention obligated the state “to organize public power
so as to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights by the persons
under its jurisdiction.”61
It is clear that MDBs’ acts can infringe on the obligation to respect
human rights by directly violating those rights or by being complicit
in a state violation. In this regard, the nature of an entity’s
compliance with this obligation will differ according to not only the
right at stake, but also the entity that is called to comply with it. For
instance, on the one hand, the obligation to respect the right to basic
primary education is an obligation that must be fully fulfilled by the
state.62 On the other hand, MDBs “may . . . have obligations not to
Rights art. 2(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families,
G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 7 (Dec. 18, 1990); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination pmbl., G.A. Res. 2106 (XX)
(Dec. 21, 1965); European Convention, supra note 34, art. 1; Council of Europe,
European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 521 U.N.T.S. 89; African Charter, supra
note 34, art. 1; League of Arab States, Arab Charter of Human Rights art. 3, Sept.
15, 1994.
59. American Convention, supra note 34, art. 1, § 1.
60. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
4, ¶¶ 165-66 (July 29, 1988).
61. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 154 (Aug. 31, 2001).
62. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
151 (2006).
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act in a way that prevents a borrowing state from fulfilling its
obligations to provide such education.”63 The ECOSOC has
emphasized that international intergovernmental organizations,
which here include MBDs, have the obligation to take measures that
are in line with their member states’ human rights obligations.64
2. Obligation to Adopt Domestic Measures
The obligation to adopt domestic measures is critical when
adjusting domestic law to accepted international human rights
standards. In this regard, Article 2 of the American Convention
provides that
[w]here the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred
to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other
provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in
accordance with their constitutional processes and the
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or
freedoms.65
This obligation is directly related to the legislative branch of the
government. In the Hilarie and Benjamin case, the Inter-American
Court noted that states infringe upon this obligation not only by
adopting legislative measures that are not in accordance with the
standards established by human rights treaties, but also by failing to
enforce laws that protect the rights guaranteed under the treaties.66
According to the Court, these acts would likewise violate Article 2 of
the American Convention.67
MDBs’ acts can also be subject to the obligation to adopt domestic
measures. MDBs can infringe on it by being complicit in a state
violation of human rights or by forcing or otherwise causing states to
violate human rights. This is particularly true, for instance, when
63. Id.
64. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Procedural Decisions, ¶ 515, U.N.
Doc. E/1999/22 (1999) [hereinafter Procedural Decisions] (encouraging
international intergovernmental organizations to enact “policies and programmes
which promote respect for [human] rights”).
65. American Convention, supra note 34, art. 2.
66. Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, ¶ 113 (June 21, 2002).
67. Id.
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MDBs finance projects for borrowing states concerning the adoption
of new domestic legislation that is not in accordance with accepted
international human rights standards.
3. Obligation to Redress Human Rights Violations
The obligation to redress human rights violations emerges once a
court has determined the state’s international responsibility because
of concrete human rights violations. For instance, Article 63(1) of the
American Convention provides that
[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or
freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule
that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or
freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate,
that the consequences of the measure or situation that
constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied
and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.68
The obligation in question is well-established in customary
international law, which has been developed by international human
rights law. In De la Cruz-Flores, the Inter-American Court stated
that “Article 63(1) of the American Convention contains a norm of
customary law that is one of the fundamental principles of
contemporary international law on State responsibility.”69 In this
regard, the Court highlighted that an unlawful act, attributable to a
state, creates international responsibility for that state’s violation of
international law; as a result, the state is obligated to prevent the
violation from continuing any further, as well as to address any
consequences and harms that arise out of that violation.70
MDBs can be challenged regarding the observance of the
obligation to redress human rights violations. MDBs’ acts can
infringe on that obligation by being complicit in a state violation of
human rights. For instance, MDBs’ acts breach this obligation by
providing financing to borrowing states that have been condemned
by international tribunals due to human rights violations without first
requiring that those states redress such violations prior to receiving
68. American Convention, supra note 34, art. 63.
69. Case of De la Cruz-Flores v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 115, ¶
139 (Nov. 18, 2004).
70. Id.
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financing. The ECOSOC clearly called upon the World Bank “to pay
enhanced attention in their activities to respect for economic, social
and cultural rights, including . . . facilitating the development of
appropriate remedies for responding to violations” of those rights.71
4. Other Obligations
In addition to the main human rights obligations, when applying
and interpreting human rights treaties, international tribunals have
construed other states’ duties, such as the obligation to prevent,
investigate and punish human rights violations. In Velasquez
Rodriguez, the Court determined that states have a legal duty to
prevent human rights violations, as well as to engage in meaningful
investigations of the violations committed within their jurisdiction in
order to identify those responsible and impose a proper punishment.72
According to Velasquez Rodriguez, the state can be found
responsible for human rights violations resulting from illegal acts not
directly imputable to it because of the state’s failure to take steps to
prevent human rights violations.73 In imputing responsibility for
human rights violations to states, the Court established as decisive
whether a human rights violation has been perpetrated with the
government’s support, or whether the government has allowed the
act to occur without preventing it or punishing those responsible.74
Given that MDBs can contribute to the state violation of human
rights by funding projects that affect human rights protected by
international law, these obligations can also relate back to MDBs
acts via the due diligence approach.

B. CONTEMPORARY RESPONSIBILITY RULES
Other sources for state responsibility exist outside of the
international human rights obligations discussed above. The ILC has
codified the principles of international law governing state
responsibility under the Articles on the Responsibility of States for

71. Procedural Decisions, supra note 64, ¶ 515.
72. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
4, ¶ 174 (July 29, 1988).
73. Id. ¶ 172.
74. Id. ¶ 173.
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Internationally Wrongful Acts.75 According to the ILC, the essential
elements for the establishment of state responsibility are: (1) a breach
of an international obligation of the state; and (2) the attribution of
that breach to the state under international law.76 This is the natural
consequence of the principle that “[e]very internationally wrongful
act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.”77
These essentials of state responsibility have been applied by
international tribunals when determining states’ responsibility for
human rights violations. In this regard, it is important to take into
account the human rights obligations discussed earlier in this Part.
For instance, with respect to the first element for the establishment of
state responsibility, the Inter-American Court highlighted in
Velasquez Rodriguez that Article 1(1) of the American Convention
plays a critical role when considering the human rights obligations of
States Parties, provided that it obligates them to respect the rights
recognized in the Convention.78 Regarding the second essential point
of state responsibility, the Court pointed out that “[a]ny impairment
of those rights which can be attributed under the rules of
international law to the action or omission of any public authority
constitutes an act imputable to the State.”79 Moreover, the Court
clarified that “under international law a State is responsible for the
acts of its agents undertaken in their official capacity and for their
omissions, even when those agents act outside the sphere of their
authority or violate internal law.”80

C. MDBS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
There is a gap in the international legal framework with regard to
the attribution of direct responsibility to international organizations
75. In 2001, the ILC adopted the Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, which were later submitted to the U.N. General
Assembly in its 2001 session. The General Assembly commended them to the
attention of governments. See generally Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (outlining responsibility,
attribution, consequences, and reparations for wrongs performed by states).
76. Id. art. 2.
77. Id. art. 1.
78. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
4, ¶ 164 (July 29, 1988).
79. Id.
80. Id. ¶ 170.
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such as MDBs for human rights violations that take place in
developing countries as a result of MDB-financed projects. As a
result of this jurisdictional gap, MDBs are not subjects of
international law in this context, and international tribunals thus
cannot hold MDBs accountable for infringing human rights
violations. That is to say, the law of responsibility does not address
states’ collective acts under the guise of MDBs. The existing rules
are based on states’ responsibility, given their individual noncompliance with human rights treaty-obligations. Hence, whenever
MDBs commit wrongful acts that result in human rights violations,
international human rights tribunals only hold the underlying state
responsible, and not the MDB.
There is a need to create new legal standards directly applicable to
MDBs, in order to fill the jurisdictional gap in the existing
international legal framework. At present, MDBs are only subject to
the legal restraints of their own mandates as established by their
constituent instruments. These instruments do not include human
rights standards or obligations as they exist today. As a matter of
fact, the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement were signed in 1944
prior to both the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Consequently, MDBs operate under a situation of
lawlessness.
The new legal standards directly applicable to MDBs should be
based on currently prevailing international human rights law
principles. They should address, inter alia: MDBs’ wrongful acts
that directly violate human rights; MDBs’ wrongful acts that are
complicit in a state violation of human rights; MDBs’ actions that
cause or force states to violate human rights; and MDBs’ wrongful
acts that facilitate or make possible private violations of human
rights.
The European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”) has
developed legal approaches for holding MDBs accountable for
wrongful acts and acts that result in human rights violations, and has
provided guidance for the creation of standards more generally. In
the Waite & Kennedy case, the Court addressed the question of
jurisdictional immunity of international organizations.81 According to
81. See generally Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999)
(determining the human rights compatibility of grants of jurisdictional immunity to
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the Court, States would circumvent the purposes of the European
Convention of Human Rights by giving certain competencies to
international intergovernmental organizations and then granting them
immunity for exercising those competencies if the States were
thereby relieved of their own accountability.82 In the Matthews
case,83 while confirming its previous reasoning,84 the Court added
that member States’ responsibility continues after the transfer of
competences to international intergovernmental organizations, which
is not prohibited under the Convention since the rights thereunder
continue to be ‘secured.’85
Because states currently are ultimately responsible for MDBs’
wrongful acts, states should seriously pursue MDBs’ direct
responsibility for the purpose of preventing or limiting their own
individual responsibility before international tribunals. Indeed, the
ECOSOC recommended that obligations under the Convention
should be considered in all aspects of a member state’s negotiations
with international financial institutions, in order to ensure that
Convention rights are not undermined.86
The direct attribution of responsibility to MDBs can be achieved
by changing the existing rules on the law of responsibility to
encompass MDBs’ direct responsibility for human rights violations
that occur as a result of projects that they have financed. In so doing,
the international legal framework will be developed progressively in
accordance with the existing circumstances surrounding the
influence of MDBs in developing countries.

international organizations).
82. Id. ¶ 67.
83. See generally Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 31 (1999) (concerning “whether the United Kingdom can be held
responsible under the Article 1 of the Convention for the absence of elections to
the European Parliament in Gibraltar, that is, whether the United Kingdom is
required to ‘secure’ elections to the European Parliament notwithstanding the
Community character of those elections”).
84. Id. ¶¶ 31-35 (finding that, because contracting States retain responsibility
for securing rights within the European Convention, the United Kingdom was
responsible for the violation of those rights).
85. Id. ¶ 32.
86. ECOSOC, Conclusions and Recommendations, Jordan, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.46 (2000).
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1. Responsibility of MDBs Before International Tribunals
The attribution of responsibility to MDBs may be justified on
several grounds. As stated in Part II, MDBs do possess an
international legal personality, and are therefore capable of
possessing rights and obligations under international law.87 One of
the derivate features of this personality is the capacity to bear
international responsibility in certain cases.88 Responsibility is a
natural corollary of possessing rights and duties under international
law.
MDB responsibility can be justified on general principles of
international law.89 These principles “derive from common rules
drawn from the major legal systems of the world, which are
appropriate for application in the international community.”90
General principles of international law serve as a particularly
dynamic source of law that has a significant value in those spheres in
which there is not yet enough state practice to crystallize into
customary international law.91
Moreover, the principle that international organizations may be
held internationally responsible has developed firmly into a rule of
customary international law.92 According to legal authorities, “[t]he
element of ‘practice’ is evidenced by the practice of international
organizations and states, and the element of opinio juris is clearly
evidenced by the overwhelming opinions of writers and the decisions
of international institutions.”93 It is important to highlight that

87. See generally U.N. Service Reparations, supra note 26, at 179 (concluding
that the United Nations possesses international legal personality and may make
claims against states).
88. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 419 (“In international relations . . . the
invasion of the legal interest of one subject of the law by another legal person
creates responsibility in various forms . . . .”).
89. Cf. MOSHE HIRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS TOWARDS THIRD PARTIES: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES 9 (1995)
(attributing international responsibility to states based on general principles of
international law).
90. Id. at 37.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
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international law governs the international character of an
international organization’s wrongful acts.94
The ILC has also codified the principles of international law
governing the responsibility of international organizations under the
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations.
These principles should play a critical role when considering the
responsibility of MDBs as international organizations. According to
the ILC, the essentials of the responsibility of international
organizations are: (1) a breach of an international obligation by the
international organization and (2) attribution of that breach to an
international organization under international law.95 As stated earlier,
with respect to state responsibility, these essentials are the necessary
corollary of the principle that “[e]very internationally wrongful act of
an international organization entails the international responsibility
of the international organization.”96
International organizations such as MDBs are responsible for the
acts of their agents and organs when acting in that capacity.
Accordingly, international legal principles support the notion that
“[t]he conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization
in the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be
considered an act of that organization under international law
whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the
organization.”97
In the Loizidou case, the European Court established responsibility
through agents as a governing principle with regards to international
organizations.98 Though this principle was established concerning
state responsibility, mutatis mutandis it is suitable for the application
in the sphere of international organizations such as MDBs. As an
international organization, the international responsibility of an MDB

94. INT’L L. ASS’N. COMM. ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF INT’L ORGS., REPORT OF
SEVENTY-FIRST CONFERENCE 27 (2004) (dismissing as relatively unimportant
the way in which the “internal legal order” of an international organization might
characterize that organization’s act).
95. U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles 1, 2 and 3, supra note 33, art. 3(2).
96. Id. art. 3(1).
97. U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 Adopted by the Drafting
Committee, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.648 (May 27, 2004).
98. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 52 (1996).

THE
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is thus compromised by the acts of its agents and organs outside the
territory of the state in which it is based.
According to the ILC, “[t]here is a breach of an international
obligation by an international organization when an act is not in
conformity with what is required by that obligation.”99 International
obligations arise not only from treaties but also from other sources of
international law as enunciated in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute,
especially from unwritten law such as customary international law
and general principles.100 For instance, many human rights
obligations arising out of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
have crystallized in binding rules of customary international law.101
Additionally, the ECOSOC can intervene where there are patterns of
systematic gross human rights violations even though there is no
treaty violation.102
Finally, international tribunals can be embodied with jurisdiction
over MDBs in order to directly determine their human rights
responsibility via amendments to central human rights treaties and
the creation of new legal standards. According to contemporary
treaty law rules, international tribunals can exercise jurisdiction over
contracting parties, since they have ratified human rights treaties and
accepted their contentious jurisdiction.103 Since MDBs possess a
distinct legal personality under international law, they are capable of
becoming parties of the concerned human rights system if the rules
are changed to allow them to satisfy the indicated requirements.
If it is concluded that MDBs cannot meet the formal requirements
for granting jurisdiction to international tribunals, a ‘functional treaty
succession’ from states parties to the concerned MDB may be
performed.104 Indeed, such succession existed with respect to the
99. U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles 8-16 Adopted by the Drafting Committee, art.
8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.666/Rev.1 (June 1, 2005).
100. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
101. CLAPHAM, supra note 62, at 86.
102. Alston, supra note 50, at 39.
103. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 34, art. 62 (declaring that state
parties to the American Convention are subject to the binding jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights once they ratify the Convention and
declare their recognition of that jurisdiction).
104. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
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succession relationship between European Community and its
Member States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.105
According to the European Court of Justice, under the European
Economic Community Treaty, “the Community has assumed the
powers previously exercised by Member States in the area governed
by the General Agreement, [and thus] the provisions of that
agreement have the effect of binding the Community.”106
Consequently, this functional succession could be relevant with
respect to states that may transfer their human rights obligations to
international inter-governmental organizations such as MDBs.

IV. MDBS’ APPROACHES WITH REGARD TO
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
MDBs are part of larger international organizations in which
human rights protection, as established by their constituent charters,
plays a critical role in guiding the actions of their organs and agents.
For instance, the World Bank’s parent organization is the United
Nations. The World Bank is a specialized agency of the United
Nations by virtue of the agreement entered into with the ECOSOC107
in accordance with related Articles of the U.N. Charter.108 The U.N.
Charter expressly calls for the universal respect of human rights and

Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978,1946 U.N.T.S. 3 (describing the ways in which one state
succeeds another in treaty obligations).
105. Reinisch, supra note 1, at 83.
106. International Fruit Co. et al. v. Produkschap voor Gruenten en Fruit (Joined
Cases 21-24/72), 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1227.
107. Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development art. 1(2), Apr. 15, 1948, 109 U.N.T.S. 341 (“The
Bank is a specialized agency established by agreement among its member
Governments and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in its
Articles of Agreement, in economic and related fields within the meaning of
Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations. By reason of the nature of its
international responsibilities . . . the Bank is, and is required to function as, an
independent international organization.”).
108. See U.N. Charter, art. 57 (stating that specialized agencies are those
intergovernmental organizations operating in conjunction with the United Nations
and pursuant to Article 63 of the Charter). Article 63(2), in turn, provides that
ECOSOC “. . . may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through
consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through
recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United
Nations.” Id. art. 63(2).
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fundamental freedoms without discrimination,109 as well as for
cooperation with the United Nations for the achievement of this
purpose.110 As such, the World Bank should adopt the obligation to
respect the human rights purposes and principles of the Charter of its
parent organization.111
There is no express provision in MDBs’ constituent instruments
preventing their involvement with human rights issues. The so called
‘political prohibition’ cannot be used as a valid ‘legal’ excuse to
avoid international human rights obligations.112 The ‘political
prohibition’ doctrine was construed based on a restrictive
interpretation of Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD and Article 5,
Section 6 of the International Development Association (“IDA”)
Articles of Agreement. Interpreting these provisions in 1990, the
World Bank’s General Counsel stated that they exclude political
considerations and prohibit the Bank from taking non-economic
considerations into account.113
The World Bank itself has recognized the interconnection between
its operations and human rights protection. The outgoing World
Bank General Council released a legal opinion in January 2006,
recognizing that the balance has now shifted in favor of protecting
human rights.114 Furthermore, the General Counsel concluded that
109. Id. art. 55(c)
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote: . . . (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.
Id.
110. Id. art. 56.
111. See DARROW, supra note 38, at 125 (describing the explicit obligation that
the Bank has to follow the decisions of the U.N. Security Council, and the
resulting implicit obligation to follow the U.N.’s lead with respect to human rights
violations).
112. CLAPHAM, supra note 62, at 143.
113. See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Issues of “Governance” in Borrowing
Members – The Extent of Their Relevance under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement,
in IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK LEGAL PAPERS ch. 10 (2000).
114. See generally ROBERTO DANINO, GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE WORLD
BANK, LEGAL OPINION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD BANK
(Jan. 27, 2006) (on file with author) (“The World Bank’s objectives and activities
are deeply supportive of the substantive realization of human rights.”).
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the Articles of Agreement allow the Bank to acknowledge the human
rights dimensions of its policies and operations.115
This legal opinion constitutes a clear progressive evolution from
the pre-existing restrictive legal interpretation of the World Bank’s
approach to human rights. According to the World Bank’s General
Counsel, the opinion “is ‘permissive’: allowing, but not mandating,
action on the part of the Bank in relation to human rights.”116 It
makes “the state of the law” clear and permits the Bank to properly
update its internal legal stance according to the current international
legal order.117
The World Bank has also recognized the benefits of its
involvement with the human rights obligations of its member states.
According to a recent statement of the current World Bank General
Council in October 2006, “[t]he World Bank’s role is a facilitative
one, in helping [its] members realize their human rights
obligations.”118 If the World Bank views its role in this way, then
respecting human rights obligations should not create negative
externalities.119
MDBs have developed operational policies on specific themes, but
they do not reflect accepted international human rights related
standards. There is no doubt that MDBs “choose their own
definitions and standards of human rights, influenced by but rarely
based directly on internationally agreed standards.”120 These
decisions respond to what is politically acceptable within and among
an MDB’s member states.121 For instance, the IADB has adopted an
Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples that does not reflect the
115. Id. ¶ 25.
116. Ana Palacio, The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank
(2006), available at http://go.worldbank.org/RR8FOU4RG0.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (asserting that consideration of human rights obligations “would not be
the basis for an increase in Bank conditionalities, . . . an obstacle for disbursement,
[or an] increase [to] the cost of doing business”).
120. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
Interim Report on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006) (prepared by John Ruggie) [hereinafter U.N. H.R. &
Transnat’l Corp. Rep.].
121. Id.

CRIPPA_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

6/3/2010 5:20 PM

MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS

559

existing international standards on the collective rights of indigenous
peoples.122
MDBs have also developed inspection mechanisms for
accountability purposes. Some scholars note that, “[l]egally, these
mechanisms have turned out to be effective forums in which
adversely affected persons can raise claims that relate to their rights
as indigenous people or as involuntarily resettled people.”123 But
from an international human rights law perspective, they are not
effective in addressing human rights violations resulting from their
financed-projects.
The
U.N.
Secretary-General’s
Special
Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises has also found these
mechanisms to be ineffective.124
This Part provides guidance for the ongoing discussions on
whether MDBs’ operational policies reflect international human
rights standards, as well as whether MDBs’ inspection mechanisms
are effective. First, this Part identifies well-accepted international
standards regarding the collective rights of indigenous peoples,
which should contribute to the progressive development of the
existing operational policies on indigenous peoples. Next, this Part
identifies the essentials of the right to an effective remedy as
established under international human rights law as critical factors to
be considered when determining the effectiveness of MDBs’
inspection mechanisms from an international law point of view.

A. OPERATIONAL POLICIES ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
MDBs have developed operational policies on specific themes,
such as indigenous peoples. These policies apply to the “design,
appraisal, and/or implementation of [MDB] operations, funded in
whole or part by [their] loans or grants.”125 For instance, the IADB
122. See generally INDIAN L. RES. CTR., COMENTARIOS AL BORRADOR DE
POLÍTICA OPERATIVA SOBRE PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS PUBLICADO POR EL BANCO
INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO, July 29, 2005, available at
http://www.indianlaw.org/main/resources/mdb.
123. Bradlow, supra note 54, at 410.
124. See U.N. H.R. & Transnat’l Corp. Rep., supra note 120, ¶ 53 (explaining
that, despite some work in the right direction by transnational corporations,
protections are still incomplete and lack uniformity).
125. Bradlow, supra note 54, at 422.
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adopted the ‘Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples’ (“OP-765”)
on February 22, 2006; the World Bank adopted the ‘Revised
Operational Policy and Bank Procedure on Indigenous Peoples’
(“OP/BP 4.10”) on May 10, 2005; and the IFC adopted ‘Performance
Standard 7 Indigenous Peoples’ on April 30, 2006.
Some of the themes addressed through MDBs’ operational policies
were already well-established in international human rights law. For
instance, when applying human rights treaties the supervisory bodies
considered the rights of indigenous peoples extensively, especially
within the Inter-American System.126 The human rights standards
developed by the supervisory bodies are particularly relevant when
considering the rights of indigenous peoples vis-à-vis MDB
financed-projects, especially extractive industry projects.
A number of human rights law principles specifically protect the
rights of indigenous peoples.127 These rights deal with several issues
of relevance for the well-being of indigenous peoples as distinct
peoples. With respect to extractive industry projects on indigenous
lands financed by MDBs, the most important rights include property
rights to land and natural resources and the right to selfdetermination. Additionally, as a procedural guarantee, the free,
prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples plays a critical
role in ensuring states’ compliance with the duty to respect the
aforementioned rights. These rights are of a collective nature, and are
critical for the survival of indigenous peoples’ government and
society. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
states that “indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are
indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral
development as peoples.”128

126. See generally INDIAN L. RES. CTR., COMENTARIOS AL BORRADOR DE LA
POLÍTICA OPERATIVA SOBRE PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS PUBLICADO POR EL BANCO
INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (2005).
127. See, e.g., U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295, pmbl., U.N. Doc A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (“[I]ndigenous peoples
are equal to all other peoples.”)
128. See id.; see also OAS, Record of the Current Status of the Draft American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, art. VI(1),
GT/DADIN/doc.301/07 (Apr. 27, 2007) (containing draft language that eventually
ended up in the U.N. Declaration).
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The following sections of this Part address the question of the
international standards on the collective rights of indigenous peoples
as developed by human rights instruments and supervisory bodies, in
order to identify and determine their extension. MDBs should not
only consider these internationally well-established standards when
drafting their operational policies, but they should also use them
when investigating and making recommendations to their Boards of
Directors on specific projects through their inspection mechanisms.
1. Property Rights to Land and Natural Resources
Indigenous peoples’ property rights to land and natural resources
are critical in assuring their physical and cultural survival as distinct
peoples within existing nation-states. According to political leaders,
“[w]ithout their land base, [indigenous peoples] may be able to
survive as individuals in the dominant economy and culture of their
[non-indigenous] neighbors, but they will not be able to survive and
prosper as distinct peoples with distinct cultures and traditions.”129 It
is clear that “governments throughout the Americas, led by
Europeans and their descendants, have sought to expropriate, allot,
and control [indigenous] land and resources as a means of
assimilating [indigenous peoples].”130 Consequently, legislation and
policies built on the presumption of European superiority over native
culture are no longer sustainable.
A number of rules of international human rights law protect
indigenous peoples’ property rights to land and natural resources.
First, international treaty law rules guarantee the protection of
indigenous peoples’ property rights to land and natural resources,
including the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) Convention
169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries.131
129. See generally Armstrong Wiggins, Indian Rights and the Environment, 18
YALE J. INT’L L. 345, 348 (1993) (discussing the rights of Indian tribes in Central
and South America) [hereinafter Wiggins, Indian Rights and the Environment].
130. Id.
131. See International Labor Organization, Convention concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 14(1), ILOLEX C169 (June 27,
1989).
The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the
lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition,
measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the
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Second, international customary law rules protect indigenous
peoples’ right to lands and natural resources. In this regard, it is
important to note that the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples contains several rules of customary international
law on indigenous issues. For instance, Article 26 of the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples affirms that
indigenous peoples have ownership, development, use, and control
rights over lands and resources that the people have traditionally
owned, occupied, or used, and that the state should give legal
recognition to these rights.132
Third, general principles of international law also protect
indigenous peoples’ collective property rights to lands. Numerous
national constitutions in Latin American countries have a specific
provision related to such recognition and protection, including
Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, and Peru.133 Even the United States appears to
concede the importance of these property rights. In a statement at the
OAS, the U.S. affirmed that “[i]ndigenous peoples should have the
collective right to lands that they own or occupy, including subsurface resources. States should give legal recognition to such lands
and resources and this recognition should be conducted with due
peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to
which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional
activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples
and shifting cultivators in this respect.
Id.; see also id. art. 15(1) (addressing the right of indigenous people to the natural
resources on their land).
132. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 127,
art. 26 (requiring that the state respect the indigenous peoples’ traditional customs
and system of land ownership).
133. CONSTITUCION DE ARGENTINA art. 75.17; REPUBLICA DEL BOLIVIA
CONSTITUCION DE 2009 art. 171; REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA CONSTITUCION DE
1985 CON LAS REFORMA DE 1993 arts. 67-68; REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR
CONSTITUCIONES DE 2008 art. 84.2; CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESDADOS
UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 27.VII, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federacion
[D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917, (Mex.); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA
DE NICARAGUA [Cn.] art. 89, La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 January 1987, as amended by Ley
No. 330, Reforma Parcial a la Constitucion Politica de la Republica de Nicaragua,
Jan. 18, 2000, L.G. Jan. 19, 2000; CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE
PANAMA art. 123; REPUBLICA DE PARAGUAY CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE 1992 art.
64; CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU 1993 CON LAS REFORMAS DE 1995, 2000,
2002, 2004, Y 2005 (HASTA OCTUBRE) art. 89.
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respect to the customs, traditions, and land tenure systems of
indigenous peoples.”134
Finally, international human rights treaty bodies have strongly
recognized the rights of indigenous peoples to their land and natural
resources. For example, the Inter-American Court has developed
consistent case law on this matter by recognizing indigenous
peoples’ collective property rights to lands.135 In the Awas Tigni case,
the Court acknowledged that “[a]mong indigenous peoples there is a
communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collective
property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not
centered on an individual but rather on the group and its
community.”136 Consequently, the Court concluded that Article 21 of
the American Convention also protects the collective nature of
indigenous peoples’ property rights to land.137
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples has also
clearly proclaimed indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over
their natural resources, including sub-surface resources. According to
the Special Rapporteur, it “might properly be described as a
collective right by virtue of which the State is obligated to respect,
protect, and promote the governmental and property interests of
indigenous peoples (as collectivities) in their natural resources.”138
The Special Rapporteur acknowledged that, “in the absence of any
134. United States Delegation, Remarks at the Tenth Meeting of Negotiations in
the Quest for Points of Consensus of the OAS Working Group to Prepare the Draft
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Principles on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 5, OEA/Ser.K/XVI, GT/DADIN/doc.295/07, corr.
1 (Apr. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples].
135. See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 222 (Mar. 29, 2006) (finding that denial of land rights to the
Sawhoyamaxa is detrimental to the community’s values); Yakye Axa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 157-58 (June 17,
2005) (remarking that the right to live in ancestral territory flows from the right to
life); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 104, 139 (Aug. 31, 2001) (accepting the Commission’s
argument that the failure to adopt measures protecting the land and resources of the
Awas Tingi violated Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention).
136. See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149.
137. Id. ¶ 148.
138. U.N. Special Rapporteur, Erica-Irene A. Daes, Indigenous Peoples’
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, ¶ 40, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 (July
13, 2004).
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prior, fair and lawful disposition of the resources, indigenous peoples
are the owners of the natural resources on or under their land and
territories.”139 The Special Rapporteur further recognized that,
“[i]ndigenous peoples, if deprived of the natural resources pertaining
to their lands and territories, would be deprived of meaningful
economic and political self-determination.”140
Accordingly, there is a clear duty to respect the aforementioned
indigenous property rights. The Inter-American Court defined this
duty as including two obligations. First, states have a positive
obligation to demarcate and title indigenous lands.141 Second, states
have a negative obligation to prevent their agents or third parties
from acting in ways that might affect the indigenous territory.142
2. Right to Self-Determination and Self-Government
The right to self-determination also plays a critical role in assuring
the involvement of indigenous peoples’ government in the decisionmaking process regarding projects that might affect their collective
interests, such as land and natural resources. The right to selfdetermination includes the right to self-government, which implies
the collective right to exercise full authority over land and natural
resources. Private and governmental outsiders must be prepared to
respect the authority and decisions stemming from the relevant
indigenous customary law and decision-making institutions.
Generally speaking, international conventions have established the
right to self-determination of peoples.143 In particular, indigenous
peoples’ right to self-determination is recognized by international
human rights law principles, such as the principles established under
the ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
in Independent Countries.144 Additionally, the U.N. Declaration on

139. Id. ¶ 54.
140. Id. ¶ 58.
141. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 1 (granting universally the right to
self-determination, and specifically addressing the right to engage in different
forms of development and to pursue various “means of subsistence”).
144. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, supra note 131, art. 7 (affirming the rights of indigenous people to
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the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes indigenous peoples’
right to self-determination145 and self-government.146 Finally, the
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples also
establishes the right of indigenous peoples to participate in decisionmaking processes dealing with matters that might affect their
collective interests.147
Some states have adopted the same approach. According to the
United States, states should recognize “that indigenous peoples have
the collective right to self-determination within the nations in which
they reside,” which means the right to self-government in matters
relating to their internal affairs, including economic activities, land
and resource management, and the environment.148
Based on the above, it is clear that the right to self-determination
of indigenous peoples is a collective right deeply connected with
property rights to land and natural resources. By virtue of these
rights, indigenous peoples should participate in the decision-making
process related to projects that might affect their collective interests.
Consequently, the concerned indigenous people must be consulted
by the corresponding state agency when reviewing instruments for
environmental assessment dealing with extractive industry projects
financed by MDBs and developed on indigenous lands.
3. The Question of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
Prior to the approval of any extractive industry project financed by
MDBs within indigenous lands, the corresponding environmental
state agency has to consult with the potential project-affected
direct and control their own development).
145. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 127,
art. 3. This instrument represents the most updated legal statement on indigenous
self-determination as it was recently adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on
September 13, 2007. Id.
146. See id. art. 4 (“Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to selfdetermination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to
their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their
autonomous functions.”).
147. See id. art. 18 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to
maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.”).
148. Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 134, ¶ 3.
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indigenous community as early as possible. When seeking
indigenous peoples’ consent, the consent must include all of the
following factors: (1) “free”, in the sense that the consent should be
given without coercion, duress, bribery, or any threat or external
manipulation; (2) “prior”, in that the consent should be given before
each decision-making stage in the project’s planning and
implementation; and (3) “informed”, meaning that the consent
should be given only after the project-affected indigenous
community has been provided with all material information related
to the project in an appropriate language and format.149 It is important
to emphasize that free, prior, and informed consent (“FPIC”) is a
procedural guarantee—not a substantial right—recognized in favor
of indigenous peoples whose land and natural resources might be
affected by extractive industry projects. Therefore, it does not act as
a substitute for substantive rights in play, such as property rights to
land and natural resources, and the right to self-determination.
FPIC has relevant legal effects in the context of processes created
for environmental assessment purposes. This is true because it
recognizes: (1) the prerogative of indigenous peoples to prohibit,
control, or authorize projects to be developed within their lands and
territories or related to their natural resources; and (2) the prerogative
of indigenous peoples to prohibit, control, or authorize projects that
will not take place within their land, but might substantially affect
their land, territories and natural resources, or might otherwise affect
their human rights.150
International human rights law principles clearly establish the
importance of FPIC of indigenous peoples with regards to land and
natural resource rights. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples states that “[s]tates shall consult and cooperate in
149. See Armstrong Wiggins, Staff, Indian Law Resource Center, Address at
U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: Indigenous Peoples’ Right of Free
Prior and Informed Consent with Respect to Indigenous Lands, Territories and
Resources (Jan. 17-19, 2005); see also Armstrong Wiggins, Moderator, Free Prior
Informed Consent For Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities: A Briefing for
World Bank Executive Directors (June 14, 2004) available at
http://www.bicusa.org/Legacy/FPIC_ briefing_documents.pdf.
150. See Wiggins, Indian Rights and the Environment, supra note 129, at 348349 (observing that, although Indians may eventually threaten their home
environments in much the same way that others do, Indian communities have
“successfully fought to keep the regions green”).
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good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other
resources.”151 Furthermore, according to Article 15(2) of ILO
Convention 169, states “shall establish or maintain procedures
through which they shall consult [indigenous] peoples, with a view
to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be
prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the
exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their
lands.”152
Finally, human rights supervisory treaty bodies have also
recognized the critical role of FPIC in assuring the respect of
indigenous peoples’ substantial rights. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights stated in the Dann case that states
should take the necessary steps to ensure recognition of the
communal property rights of the indigenous people, and to ensure
that such rights were not waived without FPIC.153
Based on the above, the corresponding state agency must carry out
a special consultation considering the appropriate indigenous
community’s native language, customary law, and self-determined
decision-making institutions. Only by virtue of such consultation and
the project-affected indigenous community’s involvement can the
state agency’s project be deemed to have been implemented in
accordance with the collective rights and procedural guarantees of
international human rights law.

B. INSPECTION MECHANISMS
MDBs have created inspection organs for internal ‘accountability’
purposes. For instance, the World Bank created the Inspection Panel
in 1993,154 the IADB shaped the Independent Investigation
151. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 127, art.
32(2).
152. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, supra note 131, art. 15(2).
153. Mary & Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report 75/02, ¶ 131 (2002).
154. Bradlow, supra note 54, at 409.
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Mechanism in 1994,155 and the IFC established the office of the
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman in 1999.156 Through these
inspection organs it is possible to hold MDBs accountable for actions
that cause or threaten to cause serious harm to affected complainants,
and actions that are inconsistent with MDBs’ own operational
policies and procedures.157 It is important to highlight that they did so
not because of their own political will, but rather as a result of a
considerable demand for accountability from project-affected
people.158
These inspection mechanisms do not effectively address human
rights violations because they do not match the right to an effective
remedy under international human rights law. Furthermore, even if
these mechanisms do resolve human rights issues related to an MDB
financed-project, such an outcome only benefits the specific projectaffected people—not others in the same situation. On the contrary,
the decisions adopted by human rights treaty bodies benefit other
people in circumstances similar to those addressed in individual
cases. This is true not only because of the erga omnes concept
governing international human rights law,159 but also in light of the
fact that apart from the condemned state, other state parties of the
human rights system are starting to comply with those decisions even
if they are not the condemned party of the concrete case.160
155. Id. at 420.
156. Id. at 432.
157. Id. at 408.
158. Id. (observing that many non-state actors viewed “MDBs’ ability to escape
accountability [as] incompatible with the principles of good governance being
advocated by the [banks] themselves”).
159. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT HAS ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF THE ERGA
OMNES OBLIGATIONS BY STATING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND NONDISCRIMINATION, WHICH CONSTITUTES A JUS COGENS NORM, “ENTAILS
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES OF PROTECTION THAT BIND ALL STATES AND GIVE RISE
TO EFFECTS WITH REGARD TO THIRD PARTIES, INCLUDING INDIVIDUALS.” ADVISORY
OPINION 18/03, JURIDICAL CONDITION AND RIGHTS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED
MIGRANTS, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (SER. A) NO. 18, ¶ 110 (SEPT. 17, 2003).
160. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National Supreme
Court Of Justice], 14/06/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación ilegítima
de la libertad” (Arg.); Juzgado Federal de Buenos Aires, 19/03/2004, “Suarez
Mason, Guillermo y otros s/homicidio agravado, privación ilegal de la libertad
agravada” (Arg.) (taking into account the Inter-American Court’s decision in the
Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru concerning impunity laws); see also CSJN, 7/04/95,
“Giroldi Horacio David y Otro S/Recurso de Casación” (Arg.) (stating that the
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The organs charged with carrying out the inspection are not
independent from the MDBs themselves. Indeed, because of the fact
that the mechanisms are internal—not external from the MDBs
themselves—the inspection organs have to report to the decisionmaking body. Nevertheless, there is a growing opinion that these
mechanisms are ‘independent’ based on their independence from the
organization’s management, as well as their reporting
requirements.161
These inspection organs do not constitute international tribunals
specialized in human rights law, and they therefore do not adjudicate
legal issues. Generally speaking, international tribunals possess
contentious and advisory competence concerning legal issues,162 and
are comprised of judges.163 Therefore, their decisions are final for,164
and legally binding on, the parties of the case.165 On the other hand,
MDBs’ inspection organs do not meet all these requirements. First,
they do not have jurisdictional functions since they are allowed to

Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence “must serve as a guide” for the interpretation
of treaty law insofar as the Argentine state recognizes the Inter-American Court’s
jurisdiction to adjudicate in all cases concerning the interpretation and application
of the American Convention on Human Rights).
161. See Bradlow, supra note 54, at 410-11 (noting that MDBs report to the
member-state authorities with decision making power).
162. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 34, art. 32(1) (“The jurisdiction
of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and
application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which are referred to it as
provided in Articles 33 [Inter-State cases], 34 [Individual applications] and 47
[Advisory opinions].”).
163. For example, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights consists of seven
judges. According to Article 4(1) of its Statute: “The Court shall consist of seven
judges . . . elected in an individual capacity from among jurists of the highest
moral authority and of recognized competence in the field of human rights, who
possess the qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial functions
under the law of the State of which they are nationals or of the State that proposes
them as candidates.” OAS, Statue of Inter-American Court on Human Rights, art.
4(1), O.A.S. Res. 448 (IX-0/79) (Oct. 1979).
164. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 100, art. 60 (“The judgment is final and
without appeal.”).
165. This is the case with the ICJ’s decisions on legal disputes. Article 59 of the
ICJ Statute provides that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Id. Thus, it would
appear, the object of Article 59 is simply to prevent legal principles accepted by
the Court in a particular case from being binding on other States or in other
disputes.

CRIPPA_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

570

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/3/2010 5:20 PM

[25:531

process only requests submitted by project-affected individuals for
the purpose of inspecting MDBs’ compliance with operational
policies and procedures.166 Second, they do not consist of judges.
Many of their current decision-makers are not attorneys, and they are
not required to have a prior judicial experience in domestic
jurisdictions.167 Finally, their decisions are neither final nor binding
since their reports on submitted claims are meant to inform MDBs’
executive directors whether the MDBs have complied with
operational policies.168 Thus, since these reports are not judgments
themselves, they cannot be considered final or legally binding from a
technical viewpoint.
The inspection organ’s reports regarding complaints do not
constitute case law concerning human rights. Some scholars believe
that the “inspection mechanisms are slowly beginning to provide
data and precedents that can influence the evolution of international
human rights law.”169 Since the inspection organs are not
international tribunals, their reports do not constitute judicial
decisions—a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law
according to the ICJ Statute170 (which lists all the sources of
international law).171 Consequently, the reports in question can be
regarded neither as authoritative evidence of the state of the law,172
nor as judicial precedents concerning human rights.
166. See World Bank, Res. No. IBRD 93-10 (Resolution Establishing the
Inspection Panel) ¶ 12, Sept. 22, 1993 [hereinafter World Bank Inspection Panel]
(“The [Inspection] Panel shall receive requests for inspection presented to it by [a
party] . . . affected by an action or omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of
the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with respect to the
design, appraisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank . . . .”).
167. For example, members of the World Bank Inspection Panel are required
only to have certain independence of the World Bank’s Management, as well as
knowledge on the World Bank’s operations. See id. ¶ 4.
168. This is the case of the World Bank Inspection Panel’s report. See id. ¶ 22
(requiring that Panel reports address the Bank’s success in complying with its
policies and procedures).
169. Bradlow, supra note 54, at 410.
170. See ICJ Statute, supra note 100, art. 38(1)(d) (allowing the Court to use
judicial decisions as a secondary and additional interpretational source when
hearing disputes that come before it).
171. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 5.
172. Id. at 19 (stressing that judicial decisions, the only “subsidiary” source of
law mentioned in Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, are not even themselves a
formal source of international law). That the ICJ Statute does not mention other
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These inspection organs do not make the final decisions on the
issues addressed under their inspection function capacity. In fact, at
the conclusion of their inspections, they submit only a written report
with findings and recommendations to MDBs’ decision-makers
regarding the financed-project under investigation. This is the case in
the World Bank,173 IADB174 and IFC.175 Generally speaking, the
Board of Directors and the President of the concerned MDB are the
final decision-makers who decide whether and how to proceed with
the MDB-financed project in question.
There is no organ in charge of supervising the implementation of
the decisions taken by the MDBs’ boards of directors, including the
inspection organs in question. As a matter of fact, most of these
inspection organs lack the authority to supervise the implementation
of the decision-makers’ decisions or remedial actions on their
submitted reports—only the IFC’s inspection organ has been given
such power.176 Furthermore, the World Bank itself has expressly
prohibited its inspection organ from monitoring action plans
concerning implementation. According to the World Bank, “[t]he
Board should not ask the [Inspection] Panel for its view on other
aspects of the action plans nor would [sic] it ask the Panel to monitor
the implementation of the action plans.”177
1. The Right to an Effective Remedy
The elements of the right to an effective remedy are critical factors
to be considered when analyzing the ineffectiveness of MDBs’
inspection mechanisms from an international law point of view. In

sources of “subsidiary” international law is telling.
173. See Bradlow, supra note 54, at 417 (stating that once the investigation is
complete, the Inspection Panel submits its report to the Executive Directors and the
President of the Bank).
174. See id. at 423 (stating that at the end of the investigation carried-out within
the Independent Investigation Mechanism, the Panel submits its findings and
recommendations in a written report to the Board of Executive Directors and to the
President).
175. See id. at 436 (asserting that the findings of the Compliance
Advisor/Ombudsman are presented to the President of the World Bank Group in a
report).
176. Id. at 461.
177. World Bank, 1999 Clarification of the Board’s Second Review of the
Inspection Panel, Recommendation 16 (Apr. 20, 1999).
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particular, the elements should be considered when evaluating
complaints that project-affected people file before investigative
organs in order to assess whether those people are provided with
prompt, judicial, and effective protection in cases involving human
rights violations. The right to an effective remedy has at least two
elements: (1) an effective and prompt remedy must exist, and (2) that
remedy must meet the procedural requirements of due process of
law.
The right to an effective remedy is one of the most important
rights recognized under international human rights law. Based on its
indissoluble interconnection with the due process of law, the right to
an effective remedy plays a critical role in assuring a prompt,
judicial, and effective protection of substantial legal rights
recognized in national constitutions and human rights treaties. As
stated earlier, MDBs’ inspection mechanisms do not provide such
protection.
The main regional human rights treaties, such as the American
Convention and the European Convention, recognize the right to an
effective remedy as a fundamental right.178 Moreover, the right has
been recognized so extensively and so frequently in international
treaties and other instruments that it must be considered as customary
international law. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which reflects customary law on human rights, states the
right to an effective judicial remedy in Article 8.179 Similarly, the
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which
provides the most recent statement on the international law of the

178. See American Convention, supra note 34, art. 25 (providing that all persons
have a right to “simple and prompt” or “any other effective” recourse for violation
of other rights under the Convention, and obligating states to ensure that such
recourse is made available within the legal framework of the state); European
Convention, supra note 34, art. 13 (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity.”).
179. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 67, arts. 8, 10
(stating that “[e]veryone has a right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law,” and that “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him”).
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rights of indigenous peoples, includes a right to an effective judicial
remedy in Article 40.180 The American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man also contains a provision on effective judicial
remedies,181 and the Inter-American Court has determined that the
American Declaration expresses the human rights obligations that all
members of the OAS, including the United States, have assumed as
parties to the OAS Charter.182
The notion of the right to an effective remedy depends on the
nature of the violation to be addressed by means of a legal claim. It
refers to the adequacy and effectiveness of a remedy within a certain
legal system. According to the Inter-American Court, “[a]dequate
domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address an
infringement of a legal right.”183 In addition, the Court opined that an
effective remedy is a remedy “capable of producing the result for
which it was designed.”184 Therefore, according to this notion, a
remedy needs to be not only adequate but also effective at protecting
legal rights.

180. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 127,
art. 40 (granting to indigenous peoples the right to prompt and fair legal remedies,
and providing further that legal processes take into account “the customs,
traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and
international human rights”).
181. See American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, arts. XXIV,
XVIII (adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (March
30 - May 2, 1948), OAS Res. 30, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V./I.4, rev. (1965))
(stating that “[e]very person has the right to submit respectful petitions to any
competent authority, for reasons of either general or private interest, and the right
to obtain a prompt decision thereon” and that “[e]very person may resort to the
courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There should likewise be available to
him a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of
authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights”).
182. See Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Interpretation of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10,
¶¶ 35-45 (July 14, 1989); James Terry Roach & Jay Pinkerton v. United States,
Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1986-1987 ¶¶ 46-49 (1987) (holding
that the United States bound itself to OAS instruments on human rights); Rafael
Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. United States, Case 9903, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
51/01 (2001) (holding a violation of articles I, II, XVIII, XXV of the American
Declaration due to the detention of Cuban refugees).
183. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
4, ¶ 64 (July 29, 1988).
184. Id. ¶ 66.
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In addition, the remedy must provide a prompt judicial decision in
addressing whether there was a violation of a legal right. According
to the European Court, three factors should be considered when
determining the reasonableness of the time required to carry out a
proceeding: (1) the complexity of the case, (2) the procedural activity
of the interested party, and (3) the conduct of the judicial
authorities.185 The Inter-American Court has followed the same
analysis,186 and determined that is necessary to do a comprehensive
analysis of the entire proceedings before domestic courts as an
overall assessment.187
Procedural guarantees such as the ‘amparo’ and habeas corpus are
considered prompt remedies, since they are meant to provide a
judicial determination of the right at issue in a reasonable time and
without unnecessary delays. According to the Inter-American Court,
the amparo “is a simple and prompt remedy designed for the
protection of all of the rights recognized by the constitutions and
laws of the States Parties and by the Convention.”188 In this regard,
habeas corpus (‘amparo of freedom’) is but one of its components
and, as embodied in the Convention and in the legal systems of the
States Parties, it functions as an independent remedy to protect the
personal freedom of those who are being detained or who have been
threatened with detention.189
There is no consensus among regional human rights systems on
whether the deciding body should be an actual court. As a matter of
fact, while the American Convention requires the intervention of a
“competent court or tribunal,”190 the European Convention only calls
for a “national authority,” which does not necessarily mean a court or
tribunal.191 But, the European Court stated that if independent
185. Vernillo v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 30 (1991); Motta v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
¶ 16 (1991); Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R art. I, ¶¶ 30-54 (1993).
186. Genie Lacayo Case v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30, ¶ 77
(Jan. 29, 1997).
187. Suárez-Rosero v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 35, ¶ 73 (Nov.
12, 1997).
188. Advisory Opinion 8/87, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, ¶ 32 (Jan. 30, 1987).
189. Advisory Opinion 9/87, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶¶ 33-34 (Oct 6, 1987).
190. See American Convention, supra note 34, art. 25(2).
191. See European Convention, supra note 34, art. 13.
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scrutiny of the claim need not be provided by a judicial authority, the
national authority should be equipped with the “powers and
guarantees” necessary to provide effective remedies to
complainants.192
Nevertheless, according to the governing principles in the InterAmerican System, the rights considered by virtue of the remedy must
be subject to a final judicial determination. Article 25 of the
American Convention is entitled “Right to Judicial Protection,” and
clearly requires the intervention of a “competent court or tribunal for
protection against acts that violate [peoples’] fundamental rights,”
and further imposes upon states the duty “to develop the possibilities
of judicial remedy.”193 Indeed, there is consistent case law that
interconnects the right to an effective remedy with due process of
law guarantees, based on the general obligation of States Parties to
respect the rights protected by the Convention.194
A remedy can become ineffective because of several related
factors, including: procedural requirements; internal conditions
prevailing in the country;195 a lack of reasoned decisions by the
deciding body on the merits of the claim;196 a lack of independence
of the deciding body;197 and a lack of a complete, serious, and
impartial investigation of the acts.198 The Inter-American Court has
192. Chahal v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 152 (1996) (finding the
remedies at issue ineffective where the national authority’s—the Home
Secretary—decision could not be reviewed by another authority, only took into
account risk and national security concerns, and failed to provide adequate
procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel).
193. American Convention, supra note 34, art. 25.
194. See generally Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 189 (July 29, 1988); Fairen Garbi & Solís Corrales, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 2, ¶ 90 (June 26, 1987); Godínez Cruz v. Honduras,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 3, ¶ 93 (June 26, 1987).
195. See generally Velásquez-Rodríguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 80
(determining that procedural requirements can make the remedy of habeas corpus
ineffective, provided that it was powerless to compel the authorities, represented a
danger to those who invoke it, and it was not impartially applied).
196. See Case of Carranza v. Argentina, Case 10.087, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 30/97, ¶ 73 (1997) (stating that the logic of every judicial remedy indicates
that the deciding body must specifically establish the truth or error of the
claimant’s allegation).
197. See Chahal, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 151-53.
198. See Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 55/97, ¶ 243 (1997) (establishing that Argentina failed to carry out an
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added other possibilities, for example: when practice has shown the
ineffectiveness of a remedy; when judicial power lacks the necessary
independence to render impartial decisions or the means to carry out
its judgments; or in any other situation that constitutes a denial of
justice, such as when there is an unjustified delay in the decision; or
when, for any reason, the alleged victim is denied access to a judicial
remedy.199
In spite of its legal recognition and external factors, a remedy
could be considered effective if it truly can establish if there was a
violation of a legal right. The Inter-American Court stated that “for
such a remedy to exist, it is not sufficient that it be provided for by
the Constitution or by law or that it be formally recognized, but
rather it must be truly effective in establishing whether there has
been a violation of human rights and in providing redress.”200 In
doing so, the Court emphasized the relevance of the element of
effectiveness when considering if a certain remedy meets the
applicable standards concerning the right to an effective remedy as
set forth in the American Convention.
Based on the above, according to well-established principles of
international human rights law, the right to an effective remedy
implies a prompt, judicial and effective remedy capable of
adequately leading to the determination of the rights in question.

CONCLUSION
The international legal framework needs to address the fact that
human rights violations are taking place in developing countries as a
result of projects financed by MDBs. It is clear that MDBs do
possess distinct legal personality and that they operate on the
international and domestic planes by virtue of projects financed for
borrowing countries. However, the existing rules on the law of
responsibility render MDBs immune from liability for wrongful acts
that result in human rights violations. These rules need to be adjusted
to reflect the on-going complex violations of rights protected by
international human rights law.
immediate and exhaustive investigation in the place where the incident took place).
199. Advisory Opinion 9/87, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶¶ 34-41 (Oct 6, 1987).
200. Id. ¶ 24.
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International human rights law must evolve according to the need
for protection of minorities and vulnerable groups located in
developing countries, especially indigenous peoples. Indeed, the
human rights responsibility of MDBs is critical for the survival and
well-being of indigenous peoples whose collective interests are
affected by MDB-financed projects developed on their lands and
territories. It is particularly true in respect of extractive industries
projects, which are meant to explore and exploit the natural resources
located on indigenous land.
Finally, the existing gap under international law needs to be filled
with new rules in order to govern the human rights responsibility of
MDBs. In this regard, the different sources of international law can
play a critical role in establishing new standards. Treaty rules can
promptly lead to an agreeable solution of the issue at hand by the
main actors: states and MDBs as international organizations.

